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Abstract
This article is the rst one that considers a model of the choice be-
tween the di¤erent types of crowdfunding, which contains elements of
the asymmetric information approach and behavioral nance (overcon-
dent entrepreneurs). The model provides several implications, most of
which have not yet been tested. Our model predicts that equity-based
crowdfunding is more protable than reward-based crowdfunding when
an entrepreneur is overcondent. This is because either the entrepreneur
learns from the sale of shares before making production decisions or be-
cause the crowd anticipates the entrepreneurs behavior when valuing the
shares o¤ered for sale. The model also predicts that an equilibrium can ex-
ist where high-quality rms use equity-based crowdfunding in equilibrium
which contrasts the spirit of traditional results (for example pecking-order
theory) where equity represents an inferior security. The latter has ratio-
nal managers. It also contrasts traditional behavioral nance literature
(for example, Fairchild (2005)) where equity is not issued in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Modern crowdfunding1 is a method of raising funds from a large number of
investors (crowd) usually done online. The amount of funds raised using crowd-
funding has been steadily growing for the last 20 years. It was rst used to
nance a reunion tour for the British rock band, Marillion, in 1997 and is now
used as a comprehensive validation tool for startups, corporates, and nonprof-
its.2 In 2016, the amount of equity raised through crowdfunding passed that
of venture capital funding for the rst time, and, by 2025, the World Bank
Report estimates that global investment through crowdfunding will reach $93
billion.3 Crowdfunding is also a quickly growing area of research.4 A relatively
small number of exisiting theoretical papers usually assume rational entrepre-
neurs. We know, however, that a part of good entrepreneurship is an inspiration
and often an extremely high level of beliefs in your idea5 which borders with
what is called overcondence in behavioral economics and nance literature this
sentence does not make too much sense. In this paper we analyze the role of
entrepreneurial overcondence on crowdfunding decisions.
We focus on the two types of crowdfunding: reward-based crowdfunding
(used by Kickstarter-the leading platform in the area) and equity-based crowd-
funding.6 In the case of reward-based crowdfunding, investors count on some
extra-benets from the company such as future product discounts. Under
equity-based crowdfunding investors will receive shares of the company. Reward-
based crowdfunding campaigns are commonly o¤ered in one of two models. Our
model includes both the nancing and prodcution decision of the rm reecting
the fact that crowdfunding is an area where production decisions and nance are
closely connected. The crowdfunding method choice directly and indirectly af-
fects the development of a project and its promotion, production scale and price
decisions. The model includes overcondent entrepreneurs but also contains
asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and funders regarding product
quality.
The number of theoretical papers on crowdfunding that use either an asym-
metric information or behavioral nance approach is relatively small. Note the
1Some researchers argue that in a broad sense crowdfunding existed even in the 19th
century. See, for example: https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/how-writers-are-turning-
over-a-new-leaf-as-crowdfunding-gains-ground-1.149539
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21932675
2https://crowdfundcampus.com/blog/2017/01/crowdfunding-in-2017-three-key-trends/
3See, for example, https://crowdfundcampus.com/blog/2017/01/crowdfunding-in-2017-
three-key-trends/
4Moritz and Block (2014) and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2015) provide a review of the
literature in this eld. For international aspects of crowdfunding see, for example, Gabison
(2015), Miglo (2017), or Hateld (2017).
5See, for example, Haiward et al (2006) and Everett and Fairchild (2015).
6The addition of debt-based crowdfunding does not add signicantly new results to our
model. Most existing theoretical literature on crowdfunding often considers reward-based and
equity-based crowdfunding separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of the reasons for
this seems to be that the founders objectives are quite di¤erent in these scenarios (see, for
example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)).
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following.
Fairchild, Liu, and Yao (2017) analyze the moral hazard-based model of
the entrepreneurs choice between venture capital nancing and crowdfunding.
Venture capital provides network benets, and crowdfunding-investors demon-
strate behavioural/emotional excitement when investing through the platform.
The entrepreneur is overcondent regarding the potential benets of the venture
capital network and the level of crowd excitement. It is shown that a higher
level of overcondence usually benets venture capital nancing. In contrast to
Fairchild et al (2017), in our model the entrepreneurs overcondence concerns
a rms major information such as the demand for the rms products. Also
they do not consider ex-ante asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and
funders.
Belleamme, Lambertz and Schwienbacher (2014) compare reward-based
and equity-based crowdfunding. In either case, the funders enjoy community
benets that increase their utility. It is shown that the entrepreneur prefers
reward-based crowdfunding if the initial capital requirement is relatively small
compared to the market size and prefers equity-based crowdfunding otherwise.
Belleamme et al (2014) also o¤er some extensions on the impact of quality
uncertainty and information asymmetry. As the authors mentioned, further re-
search is required. Also note that they do not analyze the case when the decision
about the choice of crowdfunding type is part of the model (this is obviously a
crucial part of our model; consequently they automatically do not consider the
possibility that rms can signal their quality with their choice of crowdfunding)
so they only compare the symmetric and asymmetric information cases within
each type of crowdfunding.
Miglo and Miglo (2018) consider the choice between the di¤erent types of
crowdfunding and traditional nancing under di¤erent types of market imper-
fections. In contrast to most existing literature they focus on nancial aspects
of crowdfunding rather than on price discrimination between customers using
a new approach on the demand side. The model provides several implications,
most of which have not yet been tested. For example, they nd that when
asymmetric information is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based
crowdfunding. A low-quality rm may nd it unprotable to mimick this strat-
egy as it will be taking on more risk to achieve a threshold. This result is
contradictory to the spirit of the results in Belleamme et al (2014), which nds
that asymmetric information favours equity-based crowdfunding. In contrast to
Belleamme et al (2014), in this model, crowdfunding does not have any ad-hoc
non-monetary benets.
As was mentioned previously our model has elements of both the asymmetric
information and behavioural nance approach. When information is symmetric
but the entrepreneur is overcondent we rst argue that if a rm uses reward-
based crowdfunding in the form of AON7 , the rm has a higher chance of failure
7The Keep-It-All (KIA) model involves the entrepreneurial rm setting a fundraising
goal and keeping the entire amount raised, regardless of whether or not they meet their goal,
thereby allocating the risk to the crowd when an underfunded project goes ahead. The All-
Or-Nothing(AON) or threshold model involves the entrepreneurial rm setting a fundraising
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compared to a rational entrepreneur. This result is consistent with some recent
empirical evidence as will be discussed below. We then consider equity-based
crowdfunding. We nd that equity-based crowdfunding can provide more prof-
its for the rm than reward-based crowdfunding. The di¤erence between these
two types of crowdfunding is that equity-based crowdfunding involves funders
that have a long-term interest in the company/product. So when the rm sells
shares to this kind of funder, the price of shares reects the rms long-term po-
tential. The funders should anticipate the future spot market decision from the
entrepreneur unlike under reward-based crowdfunding where the funders and
the entrepreneur essentially interact only once ( during the pre-sale/ (crowd-
funding) stage). So with equity-based crowdfunding the funders anticipate the
entrepreneurs overcondent product decision which helps them mitigate the
negative e¤ect of the entrepreneurial overcondence at the prodcution stage.
We also consider a scenario where the entrepreneur learns from his experi-
ence. Under equity-based crowdfunding, the entrepreneur has an opportunity
to learn from the market valuation of rms shares before making production
decisions. We argue that if this takes place indeed, equity-based crowdfunding
is also more e¢ cient than reward-based crowdfunding since the entrepreneur
will become more rational by the time the production decision must be made.
This is consistent with the idea that equity-based crowdfunding is a better tool
in terms of market feedback than reward-based crowdfunding (see, for example,
Arkrot, Unger and Ahlstrom (2017)).
Next we consider the case with asymmetric information and overcondent
entrepreneurs. Our model predicts that high-quality rms may use equity-based
crowdfunding in equilibrium which contrasts the results in Miglo et al (2018),
which only used asymmetric information. The result is also quite surprising
with regard to traditional theories of nancing. Pecking-order theory (Myers
and Majluf, 1984), for example, predicts that equity should only be used as a last
resort. Firms issuing equity will be undervalued. Consequently only rms with
low expected performance may issue equity. Similarly signalling theory usually
suggests that debt issues can be used as a positive signal of rm performance
(Leland and Pyle, 1977) as opposed to equity issues (negative signal).
In our model there are two rm types: high and low quality. When the
entrepreneurs of both rms are rational, no separating equilibrium exists where
the high-quality rm uses equity-based crowdfunding, which is consistent with
traditional theories. However, when one rm has an overcondent entrepreneur
a separating equilibrium can exist where the high-quality rm uses equity-based
crowdfunding. If the degree of overcondence is su¢ ciently high, the market
anticipates this and reduces the market value of the rms shares, which leads to
a decrease in entrepreneurs prot. So the low-quality rm may avoid mimicking
the high-quality rm because the market "discount" for the managers overcon-
dence can overweigh the benets from "misguiding" the market in terms of
the rms quality. We also show that a separating equilibrium where the high-
goal and keeping nothing unless the goal is achieved, thereby shifting the risk to the entrepre-
neur.
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quality rm uses reward-based crowdfunding still dominates the one where the
high-quality rm uses equity-based crowdfunding. This is because the former
may not exist even if the level of overcondence is high. For example if entre-
preneurs learn from shares sale our model predicts that the rm can achieve the
level of prots similar to the case with rational entrepreneurs and consequently
mimicking the high-quality rm could lead to a higher payo¤ for the low-quality
compared to its equilibrium payo¤and hence a separating equilibrium where the
high-quality rm uses equity-based crowdfunding does not exist very confusing
sentence. This does not happen with reward-based crowdfunding. A separating
equilibrium always exists when the level of overcondence is su¢ ciently high.
Lin and Pursiainen (2018) test whether the observed gender di¤erences in
crowdfunding performance results from male entrepreneurs relative overcon-
dence by analyzing a near-comprehensive sample of Kickstarter campaigns
launched by individual entrepreneurs in the U.S. They nd that male entrepre-
neurs tend to overestimate the potential demand for their products and hence
set higher goal amounts, resulting in more frequent failures. In contrast, fe-
male entrepreneurs campaigns are more likely to succeed and achieve higher
pledged amounts relative to campaign goals. In successive campaigns, male en-
trepreneurs success rates and goal amounts converge toward those of female
entrepreneurs because entrepreneurial experience mitigates the e¤ects of over-
condence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model and some results for situations when the entreprneur is overcondent but
the information is symmetric. Section 3 discusses the case of asymmetric infor-
mation. Section 4 discusses the models robustness and its potential extensions.
Section 5 discusses the consistency of the models predictions with observed
empirical evidence and Section 6 is a conclusion to the study.
2 Basic Model
An entrepreneurial rm has monopoly power over its innovative product or
service. If the rm produces q units, it costs cq in total.8 The demand for the
good is given by the inverse demand function q = a   p.9 Under reward-based
8Section 5 discusses model extensions and robustness with regard to the inclusion of xed
costs.
9This approach for modelling the demand is based on Miglo et al (2018). Just as in that
paper our focus is not on price discrimination between consumers. For further explanations
see Miglo et al (2018). Some papers use the approach where, for example, there are individual
customers with di¤erent demand functions (see, for example, Belleamme et al (2014) and
Hu, Li and Shi (2014)). Note that without additonal assumptions, the fact of modelling
individual consumers often leads to a similar framework. For example, assume that a potential
consumers surplus from buying the product is v p, where p is the price and v is the consumers
product valuation. Each consumer only needs one unit of the product/service. The valuation
from consuming an extra-unit is zero. Consumers buy/order the product/service as long as
they have a non-negative surplus v   p, where p is the price. v is uniformly distributed
between 0 and a. In this setting if the price equals p, all consumers with v greater than p
will be buying the product and the demand is then q = a   p like in our model. Section 4
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crowdfunding the rm selects the price p and collects pre-orders for its future
product or service. Under equity-based crowdfunding, the rm sells a fraction
 of the rm. Funders and entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and
the risk-free interest rate is 0. If the rm selects reward-based crowdfunding, it
has two options: KIA (keep-it-all) or AON (all-or-nothing). If AON is selected,
a threshold T is set, T > 0. If the amount of funds raised during the pre-sale
campaign is less than T , the rm is liquidated. The rm acts in the interest of
the founder(s) (whom we will call the entrepreneur) and maximizes his expected
prot. In addition, the entrepreneur can be overcondent. It means he thinks
that the demand for rms product equals q = a + "   p, where " reects
the extent of the entrepreneurs overcondence, "  0. A high " means that
the entrepreneur signicantly overestimates the expected demand for the rms
product/service.10
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects nancing strategy: KIA, AON or equity-based crowdfunding.
If AON is selected, the rm selects T .
2. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm selects . The market
value of shares M is determined.
3. Firm selects p and q is determined.
4. If AON is selected and pq < T , the rm is liquidated.
5. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected and M < cq, the rm is liqui-
dated.
6. The project is launched and the entrepreneur collects prot.
The following lemma considers the symmetric information case with rational
entrepreneurs (" = 0).
Lemma 1. If a  c: 1) the rm is indi¤erent between the di¤erent types
of crowdfunding; 2) if AON is selected, T  a2 c24 ; 3) if equity-based crowd-
funding is selected, M = c(a c)2 and  =
2c
a+c . If a < c, the project will not be
undertaken.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 is not surprising given that in the absence of any nancial market
imperfections every type of nancing should have the same result (similar to
the Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958)). In Belleamme et al (2014) the result
would be the same if one assumes that there are no ad-hoc non-monetary benets
for funders during the pre-sale stage. Indeed in the absence of these benets,
discusses the models robustness with regard to changes in the demand functions.
10Our model closely follows Belleamme et al (2014) and Miglo et al (2018). Unlike Belle-
amme et al (2014), our model does not have any non-monetary benets for crowdfunders.
Our main focus is the role of the entrepreneurs overcondence on the crowdfunding outcome.
Overcondence is not part of either of the above mentioned papers.
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the pre-sale price and the sale price should be equal (uniform pricing).11 Non-
arbitrage condition plays an important role in this. If prices are di¤erent, funders
would rationally wait if the sale price is lower or buy everything during the pre-
sale. But then there is no need for two stages (pre-sale and nal sale). So in our
model we dont have separate pre-sale and sale stages. Miglo et al (2018) provide
a detailed discussion of this aspect. However under equity-based crowdfunding
the sale of shares and the product are driven by two competely di¤erent interests.
This di¤erence is crucial for our analysis as we will later see.
Now consider the case when the entrepreneur is overcondent.
2.1 Reward-Based Crowdfunding: KIA
The rm maximizes the entrepreneurs expected prot  = pq cq = (p c)q =
(p  c)(a+ "  p) subject to p  c (otherwise the funds raised will not cover the
production cost). So from the entrepreneurs point of view the optimal price is:
p =
a+ "+ c
2
(1)
With this price, the rms expected prot equals
 = (
a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a  a+ "+ c
2
) =
(a  c)2   "2
4
(2)
Note that in (2) the demand equals q = a   p. The entrepreneur, however,
thinks that q = a+ "  p so he expects the following amount of prot:
(
a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a+ "  a+ "+ c
2
) =
(a+ "  c)2
4
(3)
This is greater than (2) because " > 0. Note that p  c because a  c and
" > 0.
2.2 Reward-Based Crowdfunding: AON
The rm chooses T and p to maximize  where  = (p   c)(a + "   p) if
pq = p(a+ "  p)  T and  = 0 if pq = p(a+ "  p) < T .
The solution is any T such as T  p(a  p) where p = a+"+c2 , which implies
T  (a+ ")
2   c2
4
(4)
11 In fact in Belleamme et al (2014) in the absense of these benets the only case when
prices are equal will be the one where both prices are equal to cost leaving the entrepreneur
with zero prot. The best strategy for them would be then to set the pre-sale price above the
maximum possible valuation (non-informative price) where no one pre-orders and make the
sale price equal as in our paper. Also note that if, for example, one uses a slightly di¤erent
approach, where instead of ad-hoc benets there is a discount on crowdfunding sale prices
(waiting cost for funders) one can easily show that crowdfunding makes smaller prot for the
rm than uniform pricing (see Miglo (2018)).
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The rms expected sales are: p(a   p) = a+"+c2 (a   a+"+c2 ) = a
2 (c+")2
4 ,
which is less than the amount expected by the entrepreneur: (a+")
2 c2
4 . If
T  a2 (c+")24 , the rms prot equals
 = (
a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a  a+ "+ c
2
) =
(a  c)2   "2
4
This is less than the amount expected by the entrepreneur: (p c)(a+" p) =
(a+"+c2   c)(a+ "  a+"+c2 ) = (a+" c)
2
4 . If
T >
a2   (c+ ")2
4
(5)
, the project will fail. If it is assumed that the entrepreneur can select any T as
long as it satises the optimality conditions from his point of view, we get the
following result.
Lemma 2. An overcondent entrepreneur fails more often than a rational
entrepreneur.
The proof follows from noting that the right side of (4) is greater than that
of (5) so the entrepreneur can select T such that a
2 (c+")2
4 < T  (a+")
2 c2
4 ,
and then he thinks that the threshold will be reached when in reality it will not
be.
2.3 Equity-Based Crowdfunding
After shares are sold, the rm choses q to maximize the entrepreneurs expected
prot. Two cases are possible. Either the entrepreneur ignores the information
from the market valuation of shares and remains overcondent (this case will
be considered in section 2.3.1) or he learns from it (this case will be considered
in section 2.3.2). Chen et al (2018) provide a discussion of issues related to
entrepreneurial overcondence and learning. It still remains puzzling whether
or not entrepreneurs learn from experience. Examples of issues related to this
question include small samples (March, Sproull, and Tamuz (1991)) and the
challenges of causal inference when feedback is unreliable (March and Olsen
(1976)). Brehmer (1980) noted that people do not always improve their judg-
ment with experience. Individual biases related to overcondence undermine the
e¢ cacy with which inference is drawn from experience (Hayward, Shepherd, and
Gri¢ n (2006), Åstebro et al. (2014), Cain, Moore, and Haran (2015)). Some
recent research, however, argues that overcondence can even improve learning
in some cases.12
2.3.1 Entrepreneur ignores information from the market valuation
of shares and remain overcondent
Proposition 1. Equity-based crowdfunding leads to higher expected prot than
reward-based crowdfunding. In some cases the outcome is the same as in the
12See, for example, Puiu (2016).
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case with rational entrepreneur.
Proof. See Appendix.
Below we show an illustration of some cases considered in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. One possible scenario is the following. The entrepreneur o¤ers  that
satises
2c
a+ "+ c
   2c
a  "+ c (6)
and expects that M satises
M =
(a+ "  c)2
4(1  ) (7)
The reason why the entrepreneur can o¤er any  that satises (6) is because if
the entrepreneurs expectations aboutM were true, his payo¤would not depend
on . Indeed the entrepreneurs payo¤ (from his point of view) equals
(1  )(pq +M   cq) = (1  )((a+ "  q)q +M   cq) (8)
Here q optimizes the rms proft after shares are sold. Hence q = a+" c2 . If
M were to be equal to (7) then the entrepreneurs payo¤ would be equal to
(1  )( (a+" c)24 + (a+" c)
2
4(1 ) ) =
(a+" c)2
4 and it would not depend on . Note
also that this equals (3) meaning that the entreprneur expectes athe same prot
under both methods of crowdfunding.
However, after o¤ering  for sale, the entrepreneur will soon nd out that
M equals
M = ac  c
2

Then the rm is not able to produce an optimal quantity from the entrepreneurs
point of view and we have q = Mc = a  c and p = "+ c . The rms expected
prot equals
(1  )qp = (1  )(a  c

)
c

(9)
Here p = a  q = c . The funderspayo¤ equals (a  c ) c = ac  c
2
 =M .
(9) is greater than (2) when  satises (6). Indeed the derivative of (9)
rst increases in  and then decreases. In the corners (i.e. when  = 2ca+"+c
or 2ca "+c ) (9) equals (2) but in the middle it is greater. For example, when
 = 2ca+c , the rms prot equals
(a c)2
4 .
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Equity-based crowdfunding
has two parts. On one hand, funders (who dont know the rms type) buy shares
and make investments. The degree of overcondence a¤ects the fraction of eq-
uity o¤ered to funders. The higher the degree of overcondence, the smaller the
fraction o¤ered. On the other hand, after shares are sold, the rm sells their
product to their customers. The funders know the future demand functions
which cannot be changed (unlike mistakes in entrepreneurial decisions due to
overcondence) and therefore the funders can strategically anticipate the likely
scenario and predict the entrepreneurs behavior. This is di¤erent from selling
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the product using pre-orders like in the case of reward-based crowdfunding. In
this case the whole process is just a one-time interaction between the entrepre-
neur and the funders so there is no room to smooth entrepreneurial mistakes in
the future. The funders understand this and so the rms prot is lower than
in the case of equity-based crowdfunding.
Quite paradoxically, at the moment when the entrpereneur makes his deci-
sion, he does not realize that equity-based crowdfunding leads to a higher payo¤
becasue he thinks it should be equal to (a+" c)
2
4 which is the same amount as
in (3).
2.3.2 Entrepreneur learns from the market valuation of shares.
The di¤erence between the case with learning and the case without learning
can be attributed to the origin of overcondence (see, for example, Chen et al
(2018)). In the case with learning one can assume that the entrepreneur is quite
a rational person but he probably is the subject of bad information or is facing
the problem of lack of objective information at the beginning of his project
and this is the main reason for his/her overcondence. Once he realized this
after observing the demand for shares, he makes all corrections immediately. In
the case without learning however one can think, for example, that the origin
of overcondence is more psychological and is based on personality. Here the
entrepreneur is less rational and even after observing the demand for shares and
understanding that something is wrong compared to his initial plans he would
think that it happened for some unexpected or even hazardous factors and so
nothing serious should be changed in the decision-making process.
Proposition 1 holds for the case with learning as well.
Below we show an illustration of some cases considered in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 for the case with learning. One possible scenario is the following. The
entrepreneur o¤ers
 >
2c
a  "+ c (10)
and expects that M satises (7). This is similar to the previous case since the
entrepreneur is overcondent when the rm sells shares. Also similarly, the
entrepreneur can o¤er any  that satises (10) because if the entrepreneurs
expectations aboutM were true, then his payo¤ equals (a+" c)
2
4 and it does not
depend on .
However, after o¤ering  for sale, the entrepreneur will soon nd out that
M equals
M =
(a  c)2
4(1  ) (11)
Then the rm is able to produce an optimal quantity from the entrepreneurs
point of view and we have q = a c2 and p =
a+c
2 . The rms expected prot
equals
(1  )( (a  c)
2
4
+M)
10
Since M is determined according to (11), this equals (a c)
2
4 . This is greater
than (2). The funderspayo¤ equals ( (a c)
2
4 +M) =M so the funder does not
loose any money.
As was shown, in some cases , the rms payo¤ under equity-based crowd-
funding is the same as under reward-based crowdfunding but under some sce-
narios it can be higher. In fact, in some scenarios the entreprneurs payo¤ is the
same as it would be if he was completely rational. It is consistent with Fairchild
(2005) in that the overcondence does not necessarily hurt entrepreneurs.
3 Asymmetric information and overcondent en-
trepreneur
In this section we analyze the model where entrepreneurs are overcondent and
asymmetric information exists between entrepreneurs and funders. Suppose
that the rm can be either a low-quality rm (denoted l) or a high-quality rm
(denoted h). More specically, suppose that a is either equal to al or ah and
al < ah. Initially the rms type (the value of a) is determined and becomes
known to the entrepreneur. Also let us assume that the fraction of type h rms
equals x. Also we suppose that the entrepreneur of one rm is overcondent and
the second rm has an unbiased entrepreneur and the market does not know
the rms type.1314 If the entrepreneur of type j is overcondent, he thinks
that the rms demand equals qj = aj + "   p, j = l; h. If the entrepreneur of
rm l is overcondent, one may have a situation where the entrepreneur of rm
l thinks that his rm has better quality than another rm while it is not the
case in reality.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: reward-based crowdfunding15 or equity-
based crowdfunding.
3. If equity-based crowfunding was selected, the rm selects . The market
value of shares M is determined. The rm produces q, q  M=c. The
price is determined, p = a  q.
13 In Section 5 we discuss the case when all entrepreneurs are overcondent. Also note that
the emipirical research shows that not all entrepreneurs are overcondent (see, among others,
Lin et al (2018)). Same holds when one considers the managers of large companies (see, for
example, Malmendier et al (2013)).
14Ji and Miglo (2018) analyze a corporate nance model with asymmetric information
and overcondent managers. They argue that if the managers of a high-quality rm are
overcondent, the models results are similar to the case with rational managers.
15 In this section there is no di¤erence between AON and KIA since asymmetric information
is related to the cost of production and there is no demand uncertainty. When using AON,
the rm should just follow the rule regarding the choice of T established in Lemma 1.
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4. If reward-based crowdfunding was selected, the rm selects p, p  c. The
demand for the product is determined, q = a  p.
An equilibrium is dened as a situation where no rm type has an incentive to
deviate. To set some benchmark results we start the analysis with the case " = 0.
It will be shown that in this case a separating equilibrium does not exist, i.e. the
low-quality rm always has an incentive to mimick the high-quality rm. Under
equity-based crowdfunding, the price that potential investors will be paying
for a fraction of a rms shares depends on their beliefs about the products
quality. This leads to the point that a separating equilibrium (an equilibrium
where rms select di¤erent strategies) does not exist. If the high-quality type
chooses equity-based crowdfunding, it will be mimicked by the low-quality type
who will benet from the higher values of shares. This result is typical for basic
models with asymmetric information beginning with Akerlo¤ (1970). Similar
results can be found in classic papers on nancing under asymmetric information
(e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984)) and in some other papers on crowdfunding with
asymmetric information (Miglo et al (2018)). Same logic applies to reward-based
crowdfunding because if funders believe the rm is high-quality, the pre-sale
price is higher.
Proposition 2. Suppose " = 0. A separating equilibrium does not exist.16
Proof. Consider a situation where l selects reward-based crowdfunding and h
selects equity-based crowdfunding. If a separating equilibrium exists, the market
beliefs about the rms type are unbiased for each type of rm. Therefore we
have (all calculations are based on the symmetric information case for each type
described in Section 2):
h =
(ah   c)2
4
(12)
l =
(al   c)2
4
(13)
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j. Also we have (as follows from
Lemma 1):
h =
2c
ah + c
(14)
Mh =
c(ah   c)
2
(15)
Suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. ls
prot lh then equals
lh = (1  h)(pq +Mh   clq) (16)
After shares are sold, the entrepreneur will select p and q that maximize the
value in the second bracket: p = al+c2 and q =
al c
2 . Note that these are the
same values as under symmetric information for type l. However, the di¤ewrence
here is that when l mimicks h, it has to sell a smaller stake of equity in the
16Based on Miglo et al (2018).
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rm compared to the symmetric information case and he also gets more money
because ah > al. This means that l has a higher payo¤ than (13) so it will
mimick h and such an equilibrium does not exist.
Now consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l
selects equity-based crowdfunding. The payo¤s again are determined according
to (12) and (13). Suppose that l mimics h and chooses reward-based crowd-
funding instead. Using similar reasoning one can show that ls prot lh equals
lh =
(ah   c)2
4
This is greater than (13). This means that such an equilibrium does not
exist.
Next we analyze the pooling equilibria. We dene a pooling equilbrium as
one where both types of rms select the same strategy. We will also check that
the o¤-equilibrium beliefs of market participants survive the intuitive criterion
by Cho-Kreps (1987). This condition means that the market o¤-equilibrium
beliefs are reasonable in the sense that if for any rm type its maximal payo¤
from deviation is not greater than its equilibrium payo¤ then the market should
place the probability 0 on possible deviations of this type. The denitions above
are consistent with the standard perfect bayesian equilibrium denition (see, for
instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) with the addition of an intuitive crite-
rion that is quite common in these types of games (see, for instance, Nachman
and Noe, 1994). If multiple pooling equiliria exist we will use the mispricing
criterion to indicate the one that is most likely to exist. We use the standard
concept of mispricing that can be found, for example, in Nachman and Noe
(1994). The magnitude of mispricing in a given equilibrium is equal to that of
the undervalued type(s). The overvaluation of the overvalued type(s) does not
matter.
Proposition 3. 1) Pooling with equity-based crowdfunding is an equilibrium;
2) if pooling with reward-based crowdfunding exists, then mispricing is larger
under that than under the pooling equilibria with equity-based crowdfunding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The idea behind Proposition 3 is simple. Equity-based crowdfunding has
two parts. On one hand, funders (who dont know the rms type) buy shares
and make investments. On the other hand, after shares are sold, the rm sells
its product to their customers. This part of the business is not a¤ected by asym-
metric information. In contrast under reward-based crowdfunding the funders
order (buy) the product under asymmetric information. So the e¤ect of asym-
metric information is more pronounced under reward-based crowdfunding and
the high-quality type is more a¤ected in this case.
Now suppose that the entrepreneur of one rm is overcondent and the sec-
ond rm has an unbiased entrepreneur and the market does not know the rms
type. We will show that: 1) a separating equilibrium can exist where the high-
quality rm uses equity-based crowdfunding. If the degree of overcondence
is high enough, the market anticipates this and as we know from Section 2, it
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will imply a signicantly lower market value of shares and ultimately a signif-
icant decrease in the entrepreneurs prot; 2) a separating equilibrium where
the high-quality rm uses reward-based crowdfunding dominates the one where
high-quality rm uses equity-based crowdfunding. This is because the former
may not exist even if the level of overcondence is high. For example if entrepre-
neurs learn from the sale of shares then the rm can achieve a higher value than
under reward-based crowdfunding and it also leads to a higher payo¤ for the
low-quality rm if it decides to mimick the high-quality rm. It does not happen
with reward-based crowdfunding. A separating equilibrium always exists when
the level of overcondence is high enough.
Proposition 4. 1) A separating equilibrium where the high-demand rm
uses equity-based crowfunding may exist; 2) If a separating equilibrium where
type h selects equity-based crowdfunding and l selects reward-based crowdfunding
exists there also exists a separating equilibrium where type h selects reward-based
crowdfunding and type l selects reward-based crowdfunding but not vice versa.
Proof. See Appendix.
The second part of Proposition 4 is consistent with the standard behavioral
nance result about debt-equity choice with an overcondent entrepreneur (see,
for example, Fairchild (2005)). This is also consistent with Miglo et all (2018)
that reward-based crowdfunding dominates equity-based crowdfunding under
asymmetric information. The rst part of the proposition provides a new result
because in the standard pecking-order theory equity is never issued by the high-
quality rm in a separating equilibrium.
Next we analyze the pooling equilibria.
Proposition 5. 1) If pooling with reward-based crowdfunding exists there
also exists a pooling equilibrium with equity-based crowdfunding but not vice
versa; 2) if pooling with reward-based crowdfunding exists, then mispricing is
larger under that than under the pooling equilibria with equity-based crowdfund-
ing.
Proof. Omitted for brevity.17
The idea behind Proposition 5 is simple. As was shown in Section 2, un-
der equity-based crowdfunding the entrepreneurs payo¤ is higher than under
reward-based crowdfunding. The same holds for the pooling equilibrium case
so, based on the mispricing criterion, a pooling equilibrium with equity-based
crowdfunding dominates one with reward-based crowdfunding.
4 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of crowd-
funding method and the role of entrepreneurial overcondence and asymmetric
information in these decisions. Lemma 1 implies that entrepreneurs using AON
fail more often than rational entrepreneurs. Although this prediction was not di-
rectly tested, it is consistent with the spirit of some literature. For example, Lin
17Available upon request.
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and Pursiainen (2018) test whether the observed gender di¤erences in crowd-
funding performance result from male entrepreneursrelative overcondence by
analyzing a near-comprehensive sample of Kickstarter campaigns launched by
individual entrepreneurs in the U.S. They nd that male entrepreneurs tend to
overestimate the potential demand for their products and hence set higher goal
amounts, resulting in more frequent failures. In contrast, female entrepreneurs
campaigns are more likely to succeed and achieve higher pledged amounts rel-
ative to campaign goals. In successive campaigns, male entrepreneurssuccess
rates and goal amounts converge toward those of female entrepreneurs, consis-
tent with entrepreneurial experience mitigating the e¤ects of overcondence.
Propositon 1 implies that equity-based crowdfunding can provide a bet-
ter value for an overcondent entrepreneur than reward-based crowdfunding.
This is consistent with Fairchild (2005) that overcondence does not necessar-
ily hurt entreprneurs. Also there is literature on equity-based crowdfunding
that nds that it provides better market feedabck compared to reward-based
crowdfunding (Arkrot et al (2017)). We obtained this result considering two
scenarios: one where the entrepreneur remains overcondent after selling shares
and the other one where he learns from selling shares. Under both scenarios the
rms prot is higher with equity-based crowdfunding than with reward-based
crowdfunding. The di¤erence between these two types of crowdfunding is that
equity-based crowdfunding involves funders which have long-term interest in
the company/product. So when the rm sells shares to this kind of funders, the
price of shares reects the rms long-term potential. The funders should antici-
pate the future spot market decision from the entrepreneur unlike reward-based
crowdfunding where the funders and the entrepreneur interact only once (during
the pre-sale (crowdfunding) stage). So with equity-based crowdfunding the fun-
ders anticipate the entrepreneursovercondent product decision and it helps
to mitigate the negative e¤ect of entrepreneurial overcondence at the prodcu-
tion stage. We also consider a scenario where the entrepreneur learns from his
experience. Under equity-based crowdfunding, the entrepreneur has an oppor-
tunity to learn from the market valuation of the rms shares before making
any production decisions. We argue that if this takes place indeed, equity-based
crowdfunding is also more e¢ cient than reward-based crowdfunding since the
entrepreneur will become more rational by the time the production decsion must
be made. It is consistent with the idea that equity-based creowdfunding is a
better tool in terms of market feedback than reward-based crowdfunding.
Propositions 2 and 4 explain why under asymmetric information a high-
quality rm may be interested in using equity-based crowdfunding. This pre-
diction has not been directly tested but is consistent with the spirit of the results
found in Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther, and Schweizer (2015) and Mollick (2014)
(that the rms nancing choice can serve as a signal of a projects quality).
Generally speaking, issuing equity under asymmetric information is a puzzling
phenomenon in the literature. It is mostly due to the Pecking-order theory re-
sult where equity represents an inferior security.18 To some extent, this result
18For example, it is well-known in capital structure theory that asymmetric information
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as well as the second parts of propositions 3 and 5 are consistent with the spirit
of the results in Belleamme et al (2014), which nds that equity-based crowd-
funding has its benets under asymmetric information. Proposition 4 though
is consistent with the spirit of Miglo et al (2018) that reward-based crowdfund-
ing can dominate equity-based crowdfunding in some cases under asymmetric
information. However, our paper has new dimension related to entrepreneurs
overcondence. Our result shows that a separating equilibrium exists and re-
spectively singalling with crowdfunding can be used by high-quality rms when
the degree of overcondence is signicantly large. It implies that signalling is
pro-cyclical if one assumes that the degree of overcondence is positively corre-
lated with the economys performance.
Equity-based crowdfunding provides useful feedback if entrepreneurs is over-
condent. We nd that the value loss for the rm can be less than under
reward-based crowdfunding. Hornuf and Neuenkirch (2017) analyze the factors
of pricing in equity-based crowdfunding. It can be very informative.
In order for a separating equirium to exist where some rms use equity-
based crowdfunding, the degree of overcondence should be relatively high. If
the degree of overcondence is related to the degree of economic prosperity, it
implies that equity-based crowdfunding is procyclical. This prediction has not
yet been tested. Further research is expected. Interestingly, Zhang, Datta and
Kannan (2015) nd that crowdfunding can be seen as a substitute to bank loans
in terms of overall dynamics. Previous literature found that debt nancing
is countercyclical (Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993)). Note also the famous
negative correlation between debt and protability (Titman and Wessels (1988))
so the result in Zhang et al (2015) is indirectly consistent with our prediction.
5 The model extensions and robustness
Fixed costs. The analysis of our model extension that would include xed costs
is similar to the discussion in Migo and Miglo (2018). Overall, the inclusion of
xed costs in the basic model does not add new intuitions. As was mentioned
in Miglo et al (2018), crowdfunding would be possible only if (a c)
2
4  I, where
I is the amount of xed costs. Besides this, we have not found any signicant
new results.
Di¤erent demand functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role
of asymmetric information and overcondence in crowdfunding. That is why
we adopt a relatively simple demand function. In dynamic monopoly pricing
literature this approach is not unusual (see, for example, Demichelis and Tarola
(2006)). Most of our results (such as Propositions 1, 2 etc.) are intuitively
sound and will hold if di¤erent demand functions are used. Alternatively, a
sigicantly di¤erent approach of modelling the demand side can be taken where
individual customers with di¤erent demand functions are included (see, for ex-
damages equity nancing more than debt nancing and that equity nancing cannot be used
by a high-quality type as a signal of quality whereas in some cases debt nancing can be used
(Leland and Pyle (1977)).
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ample, Belleamme et al (2014) and Hu, Li and Shi (2014)). This approach is
often used in industrial organization and price discrimination literature. Our
focus is on market imperfections and nancial aspects of crowdfunding and the
approach that uses total demand functions from investors/funders (the market)
is very common.
Case where all entrepreneurs are overcondent. If both entrepreneurs are
overcondent, the results would remain the same at least for a good range of
parameters values. A detailed analysis of this case can be a subject of future
research.
The distribution of types. In sections 4 and 6, which deal with asymmetric
information we use two types of rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is also
very typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results
stand if one considers a case with multiple types. Our analysis shows19 that
most conclusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, equity-based
crowdfunding is an inferior choice compared to reward-based crowdfunding. In
the case of multiple types, however, one may have a semi-separating or even
pooling equilibrium where only the type with the highest cost (speaking about
Section 4) will be indi¤erent between the two types of crowdfunding and all
other types select reward-based crowdfunding. In Section 5, our analysis shows
that the results may hold even in a multiple types environment though more
research is required. The main implication of our analysis holds. In particular,
our results show that there is no semi-separating equlibrium where the average
quality of types that choose equity-based crowdfunding or the KIA method is
higher than those that choose AON, which is consistent with our basic model.
Mixed nancing and more types of nancing. Unlike capital structure liter-
ature, where debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposed to pure
equity or pure debt nancing), simultaneously conducting di¤erent kinds of
crowdfunding is not common. Nevertheless, if mixed nancing is allowed in
period 1, most results will stand. For example, if mixing bank debt and crowd-
funding is allowed in period 1, as in Section 2, the results stand though the
condition (17) can be softened for a rm if it uses equity-based crowdfunding.
Similarly, Proposition 1 stands qualitatively but the formulas will be quanti-
taively di¤erent. In Sections 4 and 6, a signalling equilibrium may still exist
where a high-quality rm uses a mix of reward-based crowdfunding and a bank
loan or a mix of a bank loan and AON, as in Section 6, although restricting
conditions will change quantitatively. Introducing additional nancing strate-
gies such as debt-based crowdfunding is an interesting direction. Most results
regarding the costs and benets of di¤erent nancing strategies found in this
paper are quite general and do not depend on the introduction of additional
options into the model.20 Quantitatively though, some conditions may change.
19Proofs are available upon demand. Note that the calculations become much longer and
technically more complicated, which is very typical for multiple type games with asymmetric
information.
20We have analyzed a models variation that included the possibility of using debt-based
crowdfunding. Under debt-based crowdfunding, the rm promises to return the inital invest-
ments back to the funders with interest. We found that the main results of the model are not
17
It is denitely an interesting direction for future research. Note that most ex-
isting theoretical literature on crowdfunding often considers reward-based and
equity-based crowdfunding separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of
the reasons for this seems to be that the foundersobjectives are quite di¤erent
in these scenarios (see, for example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)).
6 Conclusions
This article considers a model of the choice between the di¤erent types of crowd-
funding, which contains elements of the asymmetric information approach and
behavioral nance (overcondent entrepreneurs). When entrepreneurs are ra-
tional and information between entrepreneurs and funders is symmetric, the
rm is indi¤erent between the di¤erent types of crowdfunding. However, when
an entrepreneur is overcondent, equity-based crowdfunding is more protable
than reward-based crowdfunding. This is because either the entrepreneur learns
from the sales of shares before making production decisions or because the crowd
anticipates the entrepreneurs behavior when valuing the shares o¤ered for sale.
Neither learning nor strategic interaction between the entrepreneur and fun-
ders takes place with reward-based crowdfunding which represents one-time
interaction between them. This result is consistent with, for example, Arkrot
et al (2017), whicb nds that equity-based crowdfunding provides more mar-
ket feedback than reward-based crowdfuding. The model also predicts that
an equilibrium can exist where high-quality rms use equity-based crowdfund-
ing in equilibrium which contrasts the spirit of traditional results (for example
pecking-order theory) where equity represents an inferior security. The latter
has rational managers. It also contrasts traditional behavioral nance literature
(for example, Fairchild (2005)) where equity is not issued in equilibrium. This
result has not been directly tested although it is consistent with the spirit of
some empirical papers that nd that entreprneurs use equity-based crowdfund-
ing as a signal (for example, Ahlers et al (2015)).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider reward-based crowdfunding: KIA.
The rm selects a pre-order price in order to maximize its prot = pq cq =
(p  c)q = (p  c)(a  p) subject to: p  c.
The solution is:
p =
a+ c
2
(17)
The rms expected prot then equals
 =
(a  c)2
4
(18)
Note that p  c if and only if
a  c (19)
If (19) fails, the rm will not be able to raise the funds needed to launch pro-
duction.
Now consider AON.
The rm chooses T and p to maximize  where  = (p   c)(a   p) if
pq = p(a  p)  T and  = 0 if pq = p(a  p) < T .
The solution is any T such as T  p(a   p) where p = a+c2 , which implies
T  a2 c24 .
The rms expected prot equals
 =
(a  c)2
4
Finally consider equity-based crowdfunding.
After shares are sold, the rm chooses q to maximize the entrepreneurs
expected prot.
(1  )(p(a  p) +M   cq) = (1  )((a  q)q +M   cq) (20)
subject to
M  cq
Two cases are possible. 1.
M  c(a  c)
2
(21)
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In this case the rm will be able to produce an optimal quantity of goods/services,
i.e. it can select the q that is the absolute maximum for (20) as the constraint
(21) is not binding. This optimal quantity equals q = a c2 . The cost of pro-
duction is cq = c(a   a+c2 ) = c(a c)2  M so the constraint (21) holds. Also
p = a+c2 .
The entrepreneurs expected prot equals
(1  )( (a  c)
2
4
+M) (22)
The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
(
(a  c)2
4
+M) =M (23)
We have:
 =
4M
(a  c)2 + 4M (24)
Substituting this into (22), we nd that the entrepreneurs expected prot
equals:
(a  c)2
4
(25)
2. M < c(a c)2 . In this case the rm will not be able to produce an optimal
quantity of goods/services. The payo¤ of the entrepreneur is smaller than in the
rst case so we omit calculations for brevity.
The optimal solution is M = c(a c)2 ,  =
4M
(a c)2+4M =
2c
a+c and q =
a c
2 .
The entrepreneurs prot equals (a c)
2
4 .
21
Proof of Proposition 1. After the rms shares are sold, the entrepreneur
choses q to maximize
(1  )(pq +M   cq) = (1  )((a+ "  q)q +M   cq) (26)
subject to
q M=c (27)
Two cases are possible. 1)
M  c(a+ "  c)
2
(28)
In this case the rm will be able to produce an optimal (from the entrepreneurs
point of view) quantity of goods/services, i.e. it can select the q that is the
absolute maximum for (26) as the constraint (27) is not binding. It results in
q = a+" c2 . The cost of production is cq =
c(a+" c)
2 M so the constraint (27)
holds.
21For more detailed calculations in a similar case see Miglo et al (2018).
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The entrepreneurs expected prot equals
(1  )((p  c)q +M) = (1  )((a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a+ "  a+ "+ c
2
) +M)
Note that the entrepreneur overestimates the demand for the rms product,
i.e. the entrepreneur thinks q = a+ "  p. After simplications, it equals
(1  )( (a+ "  c)
2
4
+M) (29)
The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost M or:
((p  c)q +M) = ((a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a  a+ "+ c
2
) +
+M) = (
(a  c)2   "2
4
+M) =M (30)
Note that here we have the rationally estimated demand: q = a p. Solving
for M we have:
M =
((a  c)2   "2)
4(1  ) (31)
When selecting , the entrepreneur, however, thinks the fundersconstraint (30)
is di¤erent. He uses q = a+ "  p. In this case (30) becomes
((p  c)q +M) = ((a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a+ "  a+ "+ c
2
) +
+M) = (
(a+ "  c)2
4
+M) =M (32)
It implies:
M =
(a+ "  c)2
4(1  ) (33)
Consequently, from the entrepreneurs point of view (28) holds if:
(a+ "  c)2
4(1  ) 
c(a+ "  c)
2
or
(a+ "  c)
2(1  )  c
So the entrepreneur thinks that in order for (28) to hold, he needs to o¤er 
such that
  2c
a+ "+ c
(34)
Objectively, however, he should o¤er  such that the following holds (it follows
from (28) and (31)):
((a  c)2   "2)
4(1  ) 
c(a+ "  c)
2
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It implies:
  2c(a+ "  c)
(a  c)2   "2 + 2c(a+ "  c) =
2c
a  "+ c (35)
Next note that the right side of (34) is smaller than that of (35). Therefore it is
possible to have a situation where the entrepreneur thinks that (28) holds while
it does not in reality. It is the case for the following :
2c
a+ "+ c
   2c
a  "+ c (36)
From the entrepreneurs point of view any  can work as long as (34) holds. If
we substitute (31) into (29) it becomes (1 )( (a+" c)24 + (a+" c)
2
4(1 ) ) and it does
not depend on . Consider two cases. 1. Suppose the entrepreneur selects the
 that satises (36) and thinks that his expected prot (after substituting (33)
into (29)) equals (a+" c)
2
4 . However, in this case (28) does not hold as was shown
above. The market participants realize that (28) never holds and therefore they
will not evaluate shares o¤ered by the entrepreneur using condition (31) and will
provide smaller amount of M . So this case does not work. If the entrepreneur
o¤ers  according to (36), either (28) or (31) will not hold. We will discuss a
possible scenario with (36) later.
2. Suppose the entrepreneur selects  > 2ca "+c . In this case M is deter-
mined according to (31). The entrepreneur will select q = a+" c2 and the rms
expected earnings are:
(1  )((p  c)q +M) = (1  )((a+ "+ c
2
  c)(a  a+ "+ c
2
) +
+M) = (1  )( (a  c)
2   "2
4
+M) (37)
Since M is determined according to (31), (37) equals (a c)
2 "2
4 .
2)
M <
c(a+ "  c)
2
(38)
In this case the rm will not be able to produce an optimal quantity of goods/services
from the entrepreneurs point of view. We have q = Mc (as long as p  c, the
rm will produce as much quantity as possible) and p = a+ "  Mc .
The entrepreneurs expected prot then equals
(1  )M
c
(a+ "  M
c
) (39)
Note that the entrepreneur overestimates the demand for the rms product,
i.e. the entrepreneur thinks q = a+" p. The fundersexpected earnings should
cover their investment cost or:

M
c
(a  M
c
) =M (40)
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Note that here we have the rationally estimated demand: q = a p. Solving
for M we have:
M = ac  c
2

(41)
When selecting , the entrepreneur, however, thinks that the fundersconstraint
(40) is di¤erent. He uses q = a+ "  p. In this case (40) becomes

M
c
(a+ "  M
c
) =M
It implies:
M = (a+ ")c  c
2

(42)
Substituting this into (38) we nd:
(a+ ")c  c
2

<
c(a+ "  c)
2
or
 <
2c
a+ "+ c
(43)
If (43) holds, (38) also holds. Indeed, if we substitute (41) into (38) we nd:
ac  c
2

<
c(a+ "  c)
2
It implies  < 2ca+" c . So the entrepreneur will o¤er a small enough fraction of
equity for sale in order for (38) to hold. From (42), we have:
 =
c2
(a+ ")c M
Substituting this into (39), we nd that the entrepreneurs expected prot
equals:
((a+ ")c M   c2)M
c2
From the entrepreneur point of view, this is less than the expected prot
( (a+" c)
2
4 ) in the case when M  c(a+" c)2 . So the entrepreneur will select
one of the following options. 1.  satises (36) and the entrepreneur expects
that M satises (33) as was discussed previously. However, after o¤ering  for
sale, the entrepreneur will soon nd out thatM equals (41) as was shown above.
Then the rm is not able to produce an optimal quantity from the entrepre-
neurs point of view and we have q = Mc = a   c and p = " + c . The rms
expected prot equals
(1  )qp = (1  )(a  c

)
c

(44)
Here p = a  q = c .
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This is greater than (2) when  satises (36). Indeed the derivative of (44)
rst increases in  and then decreases. In the corners (i.e. when  = 2ca+"+c
or 2ca "+c ) (44) equals (2) but in the middle it is greater. For example, when
 = 2ca+c , the rms prot equals
(a c)2
4 .
2.  > 2ca "+c . In this case the rms prot equals
(a c)2 "2
4 as was argued
earlier.
Now consider the case with learning. In this case the entrepreneur will fully
realize that he was overcondent after observing the value of shares. Hence,
when selecting q, the entrepreneur maximizes
(1  )(q(a  q) +M   cq) (45)
subject to
M  cq (46)
Note that in (45) the demand is given by p = a  q reecting the fact that the
entrepreneur learns from the sales of shares the true value of a. Two cases are
possible. 1)
M  c(a  c)
2
(47)
In this case the rm will be able to produce an optimal quantity of goods/services,
i.e. it can select q that is the absolute maximum for (45) as the constraint (46)
is not binding. This q equals a c2 . The cost of production is cq =
c(a c)
2  M
so the constraint (46) holds if (47) holds.
The entrepreneurs expected prot equals
(1  )( (a  c)
2
4
+M) (48)
The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
(
(a  c)2
4
+M) =M (49)
We have:
M =
(a  c)2
4(1  ) (50)
Before shares are sold, the entrepreneur, however, thinks (he does not anticipate
learning at the beginning, i.e. before the shares are sold) that
M =
(a+ "  c)2
4(1  ) (51)
Note that its the same situation as in the previous section where we considered
the case without learning. Actually the condition (51) is taken from previous
case analysis (see (33)).
Two cases are possible reecting the implications of the di¤erence between
the entrepreneurs expectations before the shares are sold and reality.
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a.
M  c(a+ "  c)
2
(52)
(if this is the case, the entrepreneur would be able to produce the optimum
quantity from his point of view). Note that the rms prot from his point of
view in this case is
(1  )( (a+ "  c)
2
4
+M) (53)
For this to be the case, the entrepreneur should o¤er  such that the following
holds (it follows from (52) and (51)):
(a+ "  c)2
4(1  ) 
c(a+ "  c)
2
So the entrepreneur thinks that in order for (52) to hold, he needs to o¤er 
such that :
  2c
a+ "+ c
(54)
Objectively, however, he should o¤er  such that the following holds (it follows
from (52) and (50)):
(a  c)2
4(1  ) 
c(a+ "  c)
2
It implies:
  2c(a+ "  c)
(a  c)2 + 2c(a+ "  c) (55)
Next note that the right side of (54) is smaller than that of (55).22 Therefore
it is possible to have a situation where the entrepreneur thinks that (52) holds
while it is not in reality. It is the case for the following :
2c
a+ "+ c
   2c(a+ "  c)
(a  c)2 + 2c(a+ "  c)
From the entrepreneurs point of view any  can work as long as (54) holds. If
we substitute (51) into (53) it becomes (1 )( (a+" c)24 + (a+" c)
2
4(1 ) ) =
(a+" c)2
4
and it does not depend on . Consider two cases. 1. Suppose the entrepreneur
selects the  that satises (36) and thinks that his expected prot (after sub-
stituting (51) into (53)) equals (a+" c)
2
4 . However, in this case (52) does not
hold as was shown above. The market participants realize that (52) never holds
and therefore they will not evaluate shares o¤ered by the entrepreneur using
condition (50) and will provide a smaller M . So this case does not work. If the
entrepreneur o¤ers  according to (36), either (52) or (50) will not hold. We
will discuss a possible scenario with (36) later.
22Simple algebra implies that the di¤erence between them depends on the sign of (a  c)2+
2c(a + "   c)   ((a + ")2   c2) which in turns depends on 2c"   2a"   "2 which is negative
because a > c.
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2. Suppose the entrepreneur selects  > 2ca "+c . In this caseM is determined
according to (50). The entrepreneur will select q = a c2 and the rms expected
earnings are:
(1  )( (a  c)
2
4
+M)
Since M is determined according to (49), this equals (a c)
2
4 .
b.
c(a  c)
2
M < c(a+ "  c)
2
(56)
In this case the rm still will be able to produce an optimal quantity of goods/services,
i.e. it can select the q that is the absolute maximum for (45) as the constraint
(46) is not binding. Before shares are sold, the entrepreneur, however, thinks
that the optimal quantity will not be produced (becauseM < c(a+" c)2 ). There-
fore he thinks that the rms prot equals
(1  )M
c
(a+ "  M
c
)
He also thinks that the fundersexpected earnings should cover their invest-
ment cost or:

M
c
(a+ "  M
c
) =M (57)
It implies:
M = (a+ ")c  c
2

(58)
Therefore he thinks that he should o¤er  such that the following holds (it
follows from (56) and (58)):
c(a  c)
2
 (a+ ")c  c
2

 c(a+ "  c)
2
So the entrepreneur thinks that in order for (56) to hold, he needs to o¤er 
such that :
c2
(a+ ")c  c(a c)2
   c
2
(a+ ")c  c(a+" c)2
or
2c
a+ 2"+ c
   2c
a+ "+ c
(59)
Objectively, however, he should o¤er  such that the following holds (it follows
from (56) and (50)):
c(a  c)
2
 (a  c)
2
4(1  ) 
c(a+ "  c)
2
It implies:
2c
a+ c
   2c(a+ "  c)
2c(a+ "  c) + (a  c)2 (60)
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Since the right side of (59) is smaller than the left side of (60), this case does
not work. The market participants realize that (56) never holds and therefore
they will not evaluate shares o¤ered by the entrepreneur using condition (50).
2)
M <
c(a  c)
2
(61)
In this case the rm will not be able to produce an optimal quantity of goods/services.
We have q = Mc (as long as p  c, the rm will produce as much quantity as
possible) and p = a  Mc .
The entrepreneurs expected prot then equals
(1  )M
c
(a  M
c
) (62)
The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost or:

M
c
(a  M
c
) =M (63)
We have:
 =
c2
ac M
M = ac  c
2

(64)
When selecting , the entrepreneur, however, thinks that (see condition (58))
M = (a+ ")c  c
2

(65)
Substituting this into (61) we nd:
(a+ ")c  c
2

<
c(a  c)
2
or
a+ 2"+ c
2
<
c

Then we have:
 <
2c
a+ 2"+ c
(66)
If (66) holds, (61) also holds. Indeed, if we substitute (64) into (61) we nd:
ac  c
2

<
c(a  c)
2
or
a+ c
2
<
c
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It implies:
 <
2c
a+ c
(67)
If we compare the right side of (66) and that of (67) we nd that the former
is smaller. So the entrepreneur will o¤er a small enough fraction of equity for
sale.
Substituting (65) into (62), we nd that the entrepreneurs expected prot
equals:
((a+ ")c M   c2)M
c2
From the entrepreneur point of view, this is less than the expected prot
( (a+" c)
2
4 ) in the case when M  c(a c)2 . So the entrepreneur will be following
this strategy: M = (a+")c  c2 ,  = 2ca+"+c . However, after o¤ering  = 2ca+"+c
for sale, the entrepreneur will soon nd out that M = ac  c2 = c(a " c)2 . Then
the rm is not able to produce an optimal quantity from the entrepreneurs
point of view and we have q = Mc =
a c "
2 and p = a   a c "2 = a+c+"2 . The
rms expected prot equals
(1  2c
a+ "+ c
)
a  c  "
2
a+ c+ "
2
=
(a  c)2   "2
4
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider pooling with equity-based crowdfunding,
which is supported by o¤-equilibrium market beliefs that the rm is l if the
market participants observe reward-based crowdfunding. First of all, let us
verify non-deviation for each type to reward-based crowdfunding. After shares
are sold, the rm chooses q to maximize the entrepreneurs expected prot.
(1  )(p(aj   p) +M   cq) = (1  )((aj   q)q +M   cq); j = l; h (68)
subject to
M  cq (69)
Two cases are possible. 1.
M  c(ah   c)
2
(70)
In this case both types of the rm will be able to produce an optimal quantity
of goods/services, i.e. it can select the q that is the absolute maximum for (68)
as the constraint (70) is not binding. This optimal quantity equals q = aj c2 ,
j = l; h. The cost of production is cqj = c(aj   aj+c2 ) = c(aj c)2  M so the
constraint (69) holds. Also p = aj+c2 .
The entrepreneurs expected prot equals
(1  )( (aj   c)
2
4
+M) (71)
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The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
(x(
(ah   c)2
4
+M) + (1  x)( (al   c)
2
4
+M)) =M (72)
This condition means that the market believes that the rm is h with prob-
ability x. (72) implies:
 =
4M
x(ah   c)2 + (1  x)(al   c)2 + 4M (73)
M =
(x(ah   c)2 + (1  x)(al   c)2)
4  4 (74)
Substituting this into (70), we nd that:
(x(ah   c)2 + (1  x)(al   c)2)
4  4 
c(ah   c)
2
(75)
or
  2c(ah   c)
x(ah   c)2 + (1  x)(al   c)2 + 2c(ah   c)
If l deviates to reward-based crowdfunding, its payo¤ equals (al c)
2
4 which is
smaller than its equilibrium payo¤. Indeed if we substitute (74) into (71) we
have that ls equilibrium payo¤ equals (1 )( (al c)24 + (x(ah c)
2+(1 x)(al c)2)
4 4 ).
It equals (al c)
2
4 if x = 0 and it is larger if x > 0. So l does not deviate. Now
consider the potential deviation of type h. if h deviates its payo¤ also equals
(al c)2
4 . This is smaller than its equilibrium payo¤ since its equilibrium payo¤
is higher than that of type l and the latter is greater than (al c)
2
4 as was shown
previously. Let us now verify that o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). To show this, let us calculate the maximal
payo¤ of type h in the case that it plays equity-based crowdfunding. Its payo¤
is evidently maximized if the markets beliefs place the probability 1 on type
l observing equity. If o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion, this
expression must be not less than the payo¤ of h in equilibrium.23 It follows
from our analysis of the separating equilubrium above that the payo¤ of h will
be higher than its equilibtum payo¤ if the market places the probbaility of 1 on
type l.O¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987). The proof is omitted for brevity.
2. M < c(ah c)2 . In this case only type l will be able to produce an optimal
quantity of goods/services, or both types will not be able to produce an optimal
quantity of goods/services. The payo¤ of the entrepreneur is smaller than in the
rst case so we omit calculations for brevity.
Now consider a pooling equilibrium where both types select reward-based
crowdfunding, which is supported by o¤-equilibrium market beliefs that the rm
23Otherwise the market should place the probability 0 that h deviates to equity.
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is l if the market participants observe equity-based crowdfunding. The rms
payo¤ in equilibrium is
j =
(am   c)2
4
(76)
where am = xah + (1  x)al.24
Now let us analyze the mispricing. Consider pooling with equity-based
crowdfunding. hs prot h equals (1   )( (ah c)
2
4 +
(x(ah c)2+(1 x)(al c)2)
4 4 ).
This is greater than (1   )( (am c)24 + (x(ah c)
2+(1 x)(al c)2)
4 4 ) =
(am c)2
4 +
(x(ah c)2+(1 x)(al c)2 (am c)2)
4 . This is in turn greater than
(am c)2
4 . Indeed,
x(ah   c)2 + (1  x)(al   c)2   (am   c)2 = x(1  x)(ah   al)2  0.
Proof of Proposition 4. First consider the case where the entrepreneur of the
high-quality rm is overcondent. Consider a situation where l selects reward-
based crowdfunding and h selects equity-based crowdfunding. We have (all
calculations are based on the symmetric information case for each type described
in Section 2):
l =
(al   c)2
4
(77)
h =
(ah   c)2   "2
4
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j. The entrepreneur of rm h, however,
thinks that
l =
(ah + "  c)2
4
h does not deviate to reward-based crowdfunding since it yields a smaller prot
from the entrepreneurs point of view: (al c)
2
4 . Consider the potential deviation
of l. First consider the case when the entrepreneur learns from the sale of shares.
Suppose  > 2cah "+c . Then as follows from the Section 2 analysis of this case
M =
(ah   c)2
4(1  ) (78)
The entrepreneur of type l will then select
q =
al   c
2
(79)
after selling shares and his payo¤ is (1  )( (al c)24 +M). Taking into account
(78) and (79) it equals (al c)
2
4 +

4 ((ah   c)2   (al   c)2)  (al c)
2
4 so l will
mimick h and this equilibrium does not exist.
Now consider the case when the entrepreneur does not learn from the sales
of shares. Suppose the entrepreneur selects  > 2cah "+c . In this case M is
24Note that the funderspre-orders are based on the belief that the quality of the product
is average since in a pooling equilibrium all rms use the same strategy.
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determined according to (31) and it equals ((ah c)
2 "2)
4(1 ) . The entrepreneur will
select q = al c2 and the rms expected earnings are:
(1  )((p  c)q +M) = (1  )((al + c
2
  c)(al   al + c
2
) +
+
((ah   c)2   "2)
4(1  ) ) = (1  )(
(al   c)2
4
+
((ah   c)2   "2)
4(1  ) ) (80)
It equals (al c)
2
4 +

4 ((ah   c)2   "2   (al   c)2).
This is less than (al c)
2
4 if " >
p
(ah   c)2   (al   c)2:
Now consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l
selects equity-based crowdfunding. We have:
l =
(al   c)2
4
(81)
h =
(ah   c)2   "2
4
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j. The entrepreneur of rm h, however,
thinks that
h =
(ah + "  c)2
4
h does not deviate to equity-based crowdfunding since he thinks that the price
of shares is too small. Suppose that l mimics h and chooses reward-based
crowdfunding instead. The price o¤ered is ah+"+c2 . His payo¤ is:
(ah   c)2   "2
4
This is less than (al c)
2
4 if " >
p
(ah   c)2   (al   c)2:
Now consider the case where the entrepreneur of the low-quality rm is
overcondent.
Consider a situation where l selects reward-based crowdfunding and h selects
equity-based crowdfunding. We have:
h =
(ah   c)2
4
(82)
l =
(al   c)2   "2
4
(83)
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j. The entrepreneur of rm l, however,
thinks that
l =
(al + "  c)2
4
h does not deviate to reward-based crowdfunding since it gives the smaller
amount of prot: (al c)
2 "2
4 . Consider the potential deviation of l. We have (as
follows from Lemma 1):
h =
2c
ah + c
(84)
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Mh =
c(ah   c)
2
(85)
Suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. First
consider the case when the entrepreneur learns from selling shares. The entre-
preneur will then select
q =
al   c
2
(86)
after selling shares and his payo¤ is (1  )( (al c)24 +M). Taking into account
(84), (85) and (86) it equals (al c)
2
4 +
c
2(ah+c)
((ah   c)2   (al   c)2). This is
greater than (83) so l will mimick h and this equilibrium does not exist.
Now consider the case when the entrepreneur does not learn from the sale of
shares. The entrepreneur will select q = al+" c2 and the rms expected earnings
are:
(1  )((p  c)q +M) = (1  )((al + c
2
  c)(al   al + c
2
) +
+
((ah   c)2   "2)
4(1  ) ) = (1  )(
(al   c)2
4
+
((ah   c)2   "2)
4(1  ) ) (87)
His payo¤ is then equal to (al c)
2
4 +

4 ((ah   c)2   "2   (al   c)2).
This is less than (al c)
2
4 if " >
p
(ah   c)2   (al   c)2:
Consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l selects
equity-based crowdfunding. We have:
l =
(al   c)2   "2
4
(88)
h =
(ah   c)2
4
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j. The entrepreneur of rm l, however,
thinks that
l =
(al + "  c)2
4
h does not deviate to equity-based crowdfunding since the price of shares is too
small. Suppose that l mimics h and chooses reward-based crowdfunding instead.
The price o¤ered is ah+"+c2 . His payo¤ is:
(ah   c)2
4
This is less than (al c)
2 "2
4 if " >
p
(ah   c)2   (al   c)2:
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